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LAW AND SCIENCE IN OUR AGE *
by.
A. A. Fatouros
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law,
University of Western Ontario.
Ours has been called the "age of science". The direct and Aiditac
inffects oE scientific discoveries and of their application are evidedt
around us. The political and economic structure of our societida han
been radically changed, the everyday life of each one of us has been
affected, our ideas and our conception of the world bear the clear
imprint of science; in fact, the survival of humanity itself is nov in
danger, and this has been made possible by scientific developments. To
those who live in highly developed industrial societies, the all-pervading
influence of science is evident; but the revolutionary character of the
change is probably more clear to the people of the until now stagnant and
desperately poor societies who have suddenly become aware of the
potentialities for development and welfare inherent in modern technology.
Together with other aspects of social life, the legal order has been
greatly affected by scientific developments.
In his latest book, Professor Edwin Patterson, Cardozo Professor
Emeritus of Jurisprudence at Columbia University, surveys the ways in
which. science has affected law and the extent to which the utilization
of scientific data and methods can further influence the development of the
lAw. The book is based on the author's Carpentier Lectures, delivered
id 1-krch 1962 at the Columbia University School of Law. . As an indlC tion
of their quality, it is perhaps sufficient to say that these lecturec
are fully able to stand comparison with earlier lectures under the same
auspices, such as John Chipman Gray's Nature and Sources of Law, or
Mr. Justice Cardozo's Paradoxes of the Legal Science.
The influence of science on particular branches of the law or on
some specific aspects of the legal order has already received considerable
study. Professor Patterson himself had dealt with some of the related
problems in his earlier writings.(1) But the present study goes farther;
it attempts successfully to view the overall effects on law and legal
* A review of IAW IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE, by Edwin V. Patterson, Columbia
University Press, New York and London, 1963. Pp. xiii + 87.
(1) See E.W. Patterson, "Can Law be Scientific?" 25 Ill.L.Rev. 121 (1930);
E.W.. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law, pp.26 , 50-65,
494-500 (1953).
thinking of the development of modern science, using, in the author's
words, "philosophy as a bridge between science and the lau."(2)
Professor Patterson brings to this task his broad 'knowledge and profound
understanding of lau and legal philosophy, together with his own
personal approach which combines realism and concern with practicalities,
with theoretical and formal considerations. Nora than anything else,
he brings -hat can only be referred to by the old-fashioned word
-7 is d OM"
2atterson distinguishes two inds of scientific influences on
la!: and legal thinking, the "ideal" influences (that is, those pertaining
to ideas) and the "material'! influences. The latter can be more easily
perceived. Like all forms of social, economic or political change,
scientific develoment creates netw problems which law is called upon to
solve. The invention of the automobile is probably the clearest illus-
tration of this process. The high rate of accidents and the consequent
increase in the incidence of personal injury actions, the effects of
the constantly increasing needs for traffic regulation on other branches
of law enforcement and on the administration of justice, the direct and
indirect results of increased mobility of population on the law of
property and of domestic relations, these are all problems which would
not have existed, or would not have been of the same order of imoortance,
if the automobile had never been invented. Another kind of material
influence relates to the use of scientific imhnwledge in the legal
process. Ilore and more, modern science finds its way into the courtroom
and the legislative chamber, either in connection with novel situations
which have arisen because of scientific developments, or in connection
with preexisting problems into which science is providing new insights.
Finally, it may be that some legal problems which have arisen in the past
are noy rendered moot because scientific or technological developments
have eliminated the factual situations which gave rise to them.
The material influences of science on the law are evidently of
great importance today and there is every indication that their importance
will increase in" the near future. Professor Patterson cites several
well-chosen illustrations of the manner in which scientific developments
may affect the law. He discusses at some length the "eugenic steri-
lization" case, (3) which was the occasion for a celebrated opinion of
Justice-Holmes, whose scientific basis seems to have been largely dis-
credited by now.(4) He also deals with the Miller v. Schoene case, (5)
(2) E.W. Patterson, Law in a Scientific Age, p. ix (1963).
(3) Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 Sup.Ct. 584 (1927).
(4) See Patterson, op. cit. supra, note 2, at pp. 20- 2 1. The learned
author, however, favours the retention of the ielated statutes,
on the ground that they are still of sufficient usefulness.
(5) 276 U.S. 272, 48 Sup. Ct. 246 (1928).
where a Virginia statute authorizing, under certain conditions, the
destruction of red cedar trees, was held constitutional by the Supreme
Court of the United States. These trees were hosts to a fungus disease
which, Then carried by the winds to nearby apple orchards, destroyed
their crop. The court had in effect to choose between the interests
of the apole growers and those of the cedar-tree owners, and it found in
favour of the former. The case thus illustrates the role of scientific
data before the courts, but it also showxs that their presence does not
eliplinate the necessity for a policy judgment on the part of the court.
By no,, though the statute is still in the books, it is not applied,
because it has been found that spraying the apple-trees with newly-
developed fungicides is sufficiently effective.(6) No more illustrations
need to be cited here; it is clear that there is ample support for
Professor Patterson's conclusion that "no crevice or cranny of our
legal order is icaune from some revision or modification because of the
persuasive influence of newly emerging facts."(7)
To a considerable extent, the problems created by scientific
developmants are not basically different from the problems which arise
out of any major economic, social or other change. One of the chief
functions of law is precisely to provide for the solution of such
problems, present or future. However, the high incidence of problems
caused by scientific developments makes necessary certain changes in
the accepted place of science in the legal process and in legal education.
Professor Patterson points out that the rules of evidence with respect
to scientific matters have yet to adjust to modern science and its methods.
"The hearsay rule treats what one medical specialist reports to a
different kind of medical specialist as no more trustworthy that what
"I'rs. Grundy" said to her neighbor over the back fence."(8) Such rules
are obviously inadequate; though scientific dicta should not necessarily
be accepted by the courts as irrefutable axioms, their treatment will have
to conform better to present-day conceptions of science.
These difficulties are a peculiarly acute manifestation of the split
between the "two cultures" which is one of the major characteristics of
(6) Professor Patterson, op. cit. supra note 2, at p.14, again favours the
retention of the statute, on the ground that it might prove useful if
fungicides became ineffective, or, one may add, if their use were more
strictly limited. (The lectures were written before the publication
of Mrs. R. Carson's Silent Spring.) It is interesting to note that
in an earlier article, Professor Patterson in discussing this same
case pointed out that the accepted basis of the court's reasoning was
the "fact" that the destruction of red cedar trees was the only
practicable method of controlling the disease, and he commented:
"This 'fact', ... is not obviously impregnable; it is only empirical,
and therefore tentative in the sense that later experiments in
entomology might overthrow it." Patterson, "Can Law be Scientific?"
25 Ill.L.Rev. 121, at p.1 3 8 (1930).
(7) Patterson, op. cit. supra note 2, at p.17 .
(8) Id. at p.18.
our times.(9) In order to be able to find better solutions to the
substantive and procedural problems created by modern scientific
developments, jurists7 will have to be better acquainted with these
developments. In actual fact, of course, some lawyers and judges have
often acquired considerable competence in scientific matters which
relate to the law. The medical knowledge of lawyers involved in
personal injury litigation or the technical information which many
patent attorneys possess are cases in point. The consciousness of the
need has reached legal education; some law schools (unfortunately,
still only a few "leading" schools, those capable of diversifying
sufficiently their curriculum) provide courses or seminars in forensic
medicine, law and psychiatry or the legal regulation of atomic reactions.
It can be argued that courses in such specialized topics are not
sufficient and that some of the related basic problems could properly
be treated in the general courses of the legal curriculum. But this
presupposes sufficient awareness-of scientific problems and methods on
the part of those teaching the "bread and butter" courses.
The material influences of science occupy a relatively
small part of Professor Patterson's study. It is with the ideal
influences of modern science on law and legal thinking that he is
mainly concerned. The focus of his attention is directed to the natural
sciences, not the social sciences, as one might have been inclined to
expect. (10) In fact, the author treats social sciences with a marked
lack of enthusiasm, contrasting somewhat with his more balanced
treatment of them in his Jurizorudence. (11) His main objection seems
to be that the social sciences have not been able to reach objective
and impartial results and that their conclusions still depend very much
on the particular preferences of individual social scientists.(12)
However, one may be acutely aware of the shortcomings of the social
sciences today and still feel that Professor Patterson's assessment is too
severe.(13) In fact, the methods which the "empirical legal science"
he favours will have to use, have already been used by the social sciences;
their valuable experience should be utilized, even though their methods
or conclusions do not have to be adopted in full.
In examining the fascination of jurists with the "scientific
analogy", Professor Patterson asks a very relevant question which is not
often raised: What is it in science that holds such attraction for
jurists? It cannot be its infallibility or its unchanging character, he
(9) Cf. C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1959).
(10) On Professor Patterson's interest in and familitarity with the "exact
sciences," see H.W. Jones, "Edwin !-filhite Patterson: Man and Ideas,"
57 Col. L. Rev. 607, at pp. 612,616 (1957).
(11) Patterson, Jurisprudence: len and Ideas of the Law, pp.50-6 5 (1953).
(12) Patterson, op.cit. supra note 2, at pp.44-46 .
(13) Cf., for instance, a social scientist's observations in B.Barber,
Science and the Social Order 311 et seq. (1952, Collier ed.,1962).
argues, because modern science does not even profess to possess fully
these characteristics. He suggests that it is in fact the universality
of science that fascinates lawyers, the fact that science is the same
everywhere, that the same questions receive the same answers and the
same methods produce the same results. (14) At a later point, he brings
in another closely related characteristic, namely, that scientific
determinations are "neutral and objectively verifiable."(15) One might
add further the element of increased certainty. Even though modern
science is founded on probability rather than absolute certainty, even
though it does not profess to be infallible, still it does provide a
high degree of certainty, that is to say, of correct prediction of
future events. This certainty, or appearance of certainty, is especially
evident in the technological applications of scientific discoveries.
It cannot fail to impress the layman, and particularly the jurist, who is
usually not as well versed in philosophy of science as Professor Patterson
or Professor Yagel. The law's (or, rather, the lawyers') obsession with
certainty has already been described, and denounced, by a long line of
modern jurists, from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Jerome Frank, so that
no further emphasis is needed. But one may note that the quest for
universality itself, which Professor Patterson rightly emphasizes, can be
seen as being a manifestation of the desire for certainty.
The role and the extent of validity of the scientific analogy in
law may depend largely on the angle from which the inquirer is looking
at the subject. If we oversimplify the issues a little, we can
distinguish three basic points from which the law may be observed;
the point of view of the citizen, the subject of the law, the point of
view of the judge, who administers the law, and the point of view of the
legislator, who makes the law.(16) Each of these hypothetical models
has different interests and concerns. The citizen (and his representative,
the lawyer) wants to be able to predict the probable outcome of his case
before a court, so as to conduct himself accordingly. The judge wants
to find the best methods which will assist him in deciding the particular
case and in rendering the law clearer and more predictable. The
legislator (whose exact office may be, in practice, that of the member of
parliament, or the judge, or the adviser of either of these) would like
to be able to determine, possibly by the help of scientific methods,
the identity and order of the social ends in view of which he is setting
legal rules, the most effective means for achieving those euds and the
precise ends which existing rules serve, as well as the extent to which
they really do so. In his earlier study, (17) Professor Patterson had
examined the points of view of both judge and legislator, devoting more
attention to the former. In his present study, he appears to be dealing
(14) Patterson, op.cit. supra note 2, at p. 6 .
(15) Id. at p. 2 4.
(16) For a similar distinction between judicial decision, legislation and
legal research, see Patterson, supra note 6, at p.12 3.
(17) Idem, passim. And see infra text accompanying notes 32-40.
with his subject more from a legislator's angle of vision.
The legislator's is, of course, the broadest and most inclusive
point of view. Uhat is the relevance of scientific method in this
connection? Scientific thinking is founded on the principle of
causality and causal analysis depends on factual statements, not on
evaluations. In law, however, we think in terms of objectives or ends
and they involve necessarily judgments of value. A legal rule has
certain purposes, it is calculated to induce certain kinds of conduct
among those subject to it. At the turn of the century, Holnes had
expressed the hope that science would ultL-mately determine th relative
worth of different social ends. (18) Patterson is in sympathy with the
general aim thus expressed, but he points out that there are severe
limitations to the extent to which it can be realized. The evaluative
element can never be eliminated from the law, and evaluations cannot
be derived from facts. The separation of the "is" and the "ought",
"is a fundamentally true and useful distinction."(19) In their private
life, people may in fact derive evaluations directly from facts,
through intuition or non-reasoned hunches. Such conduct is not
admissible in the case of judges, legislators or other officials. They
"should be prepared to justify their conduct by stating in logical
form the evaluative generalizations and factual statements on which they
base their evaluative conclusions."(20)
While upholding the validity and usefulness of the separation of
the "is" and the "ought", Professor Patterson is far from asserting
that there exists no relationship at all between facts and evaluations.
To the contrary, he is convinced that facts may have "persuasive effects".
Following, in this as in other respects, John Dewey's formulation of
logic in terms of problems, rather than premises, he concludes that
"the law is, in general, subject to modification or abolition on the
basis of changes in the realm of existence ..... "(21) Scientific methods
can, therefore, play an important role in shaping the ends of the law,
even though they cannot fully or predictably determine them. Part of
the problem is that legal rules rarely have clear and well-defined
purposes; even where they do, these purposes are usually more than one
and their exact order of importance cannot be determined by any fixed,
abstract method. Assuming that the ends of a particular legal rule can
be determined with some precision, it is possible to apply scientific
methods in order to find out the extent to which the rule has achieved
(or can achieve) its purposes. This is more problematic when we are
dealing with the final ends of a rule: it is very difficult to determine
whether a particular rule does or does not serve the ultimate purpose
of, say, security of transactions. It is more feasible with respect to
the immediate results which the rule seeks to accomplish: it is relatively
(18) O.W. Holmes, "Law in Science - Science in Law," 12 Harv.L.Rev. 443
(1899), Collected Legal Papers 242 (1920), cited in Patterson, op.cit.
supra note 2, at p.2 7 .
(19) Patterson, id. at p.31.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Id. at p.35.
easy to determine whether a law prohibiting the sale of habit-forming
drugs is or is not complied with. Once we are able to compare the
conduct actually induced by a legal rule with the conduct it was
intended to induce, we have a measure of the rule's success or
effectiveness. In the same manner, it is possible to study an existing
factual situation in order to determine whether legislation is needed
to serve certain particular ends and the best manner in which they can
be served.
Both in his earlier article and in the present book, Professor
Patterson examines various particular scientific methods and the
possibility of their use in law. The best known of the methods employed
by science is that of the controlled experiment; it is still the
typical method of the natural sciences and the one on which a major part
of their success if founded, In legal matters, this method is of
limited usefulness. The effects of legal"rules are normally felt after
a relatively long period of time and, by then, they are usually
irreversible. Moreover, it is normally impossible to isolate all related
factors, so as to be able to eliminate the effects of pther changes,
social or technological. Controlled experiments, therefore, would be
possible only in a small number of cases. (22) There exist many other
methods, however, which have been successfully used in the sciences.
In his earlier article, Patterson had dealt at some length with one of
these methods, namely, classification, and had shown its usefulness and
relevance. (23) He had also pointed out the limited use that can be made
of mathematical reasoning as such.(24) In his present study, he deals
with other methods, as well. He points out that the "control group"
method can be effectively used in legal research, as it has been in some
of the natural and social sciences. It would require great care in its
application, of course, since the possibly relevant factors are numerou.
and often not apparent, but this is a caveat that applies to the use of a]
scientific methods. Statistics can also be of great assistance to the
legal researcher; in fact, the utilization of statistical methods is the
only point as to which Professor Patterson concedes that social scientist
can be of assistance to legal researchers.(25)
The utlilization of specific scientific methods, however, is not the
most important contribution of the scientific analogy to legal science.
These methods point to the basic characteristic of modern science, which
(22) Cf. id. at pp.39-4 2 .
(23) Patterson, supra note 6, at pp.1 28-32 .
(24) Id. at pp.1 24-2 7 .
(25) Patterson, op.cit. supra note 2, at p.46 . But he adds: "To say thl
much for the social sciences is, perhaps, only to recognize that in
the country of the blind a one-eyed man is king." And cf. Pattersor
supra note 6, at p.12 6 .
can and should be emulated by law, namely, the "responsibility to the
facts."(26) The exact manner by which these facts are gathered is not
in itself of major importance, but is is essential to keep in mind
the ultimate dependence of legal rules on the facts they are intended
to regulate. Such facts may be gathered in several instances by mere
casual observation, without any complicated methodological or
institutional apparatus. A jurist should be aware of the possibilities
for such small-scale factual inquiries; it would not do to leave
the whole field of fact-investigation in law to elaborate foundation-
financed projects. The latter's usefulness cannot be contested; though
the benefit that will be derived from each of them will necessarily
vary- widely. Patterson points out that "the planning and execution of a
fruitful "controlled inquiry" call for exceptional imagination, insight,
and industry."(27) He describes in some detail three examples of
inquiries which have employed scientific methods in connection with
legal questions. Those three illustrations are the studies by Professor
Sheldon Glueck and Dr. Eleanor Glueck on juvenile delinquency and the
treatment of youthful offenders, (28) the Jury Project undertaken by the
University of Cibicago law School to study the reacti6n of juries to
typical (thougti hypothetical) cases,(29) and the Columbia University
Project for Effective Justice studies on the procedural problems of
personal injury litigation°(30)
The scientific analogy does not relate to matters of method only.
There is also a basic analogy between the structure of scientific theory
-ad that of legal cheory. Scientific theories are based on experimental
facts but normally go beyond them; they serve to relate and thus explain
separate experimental laws and to suggest further inquiries to extend,
complete or even amend the theories themselves. Scientific theories
change at a fairly fast rate today, even though the experimental facts
or laws may, in many cases, remain valid. Legal theory can provide a
similar "normative-logical framework' to legal -esearch; as Patterson
points out, "our law has a logical structure which serves to guide and
limit the making of ney legal evaluations." (31) Legal theories may not
be infallible but they are necessary in order to organize the existing
particular legal rules, bring out their relationships and their analogies
or inconsistencies. Looking at legal theories as working hypotheses,
rather than as basic axioms of the legal order, makes it possible to
derive from them whatever benefit they can offer, without permitting
them to distort or freeze the legal system to conform to their abstract
generalizations.
As has been noted, in his earlier study of the scientific analogy,
Patterson laid particular stress on its usefulness to (and possible
(26) Patterson, supra note 6, at p.132 .
(27) Patterson, op.cit.supra note 2, at p.65.
(28) Id. at pp. 6 5 -70, with related references.
(29) Id. at pp. 7 0-7 3.
(30) Id. at pp.73-74 .
(31) Id. at p.56 .
utilization by) judges. Even though acknowledging the limitations
inherent in the judicial function, he still thought that the judge could
be a "field worker", if not a "laboratory scientist," and rely on the
products of empirical research in the same manner in which the general
practitioner relies on laboratory developments with which he usually
has nothing to do.(32) He recognized that the real reasons for the
choice betueen alternative decisions would probably have to be stated
in tentative or uncertain "approximations of fact or debatable judgments
of value." And he went on to state: "If la is to be scientific, we
must )reiare ourselves for the shock of having judicial decisions
grounded upon reasons which do not even pretend to be arxiomatic."(33)
n his Carentier Lectures, thirty years later, Professor Patterson
seems rore reconciled to the reluctance of judges to state their factual
-nd evaluative assum-,tions in their decisions. 14e concedes that "the
judicial oD.;no. -,hich relies upon the apodictic certainty of logical
syntax may t'ell inspire greater confidence than one that rests u',on
tns -.ore or lass probabla truth of societal facts."(34) And he
concludas: "For this reason and others, the investigation of the
consequences of case-law rules will continue to be the work of legal
scholars, rather than of judges, advocates or counselors."(35) The
int oZ view of the judge is, therefore, studied only when examining
the possibility of an imrpartial inquirer in legal matters.(36)
The scientific analogy retrains relevant to the law, as seen from
tea vie oint of the judge, even though this 7=y not be readily apparent
ia the judges' published decisions.(37) The judge can, and does, apply
the scientific methods which rely on logic, such as claesification,
c:,act definition and the like. !,hen analyzing the situation before
him, he formulates several hypotheses as to the legal rule on the matter,
some of uhich he rejects either because they do not fit the facts before
him or because they lead to undesired logical or factual consequences.
:i :ever inadequate it nay sound at first, this process of "imagined
exerimentation" is, in fact, common to all the sciences. The judge is
relying on his trained sensibility and, if the need arose, it would be
possible to justify a posteriori most of his guesses on more scientific
grounds. It is probable, however, that in some cases his "guess" would
be wrong, and that it could have been more correct if it were based on
conscious and open inquiry into societal facts.
The figure of the scientist as the "by-truth-possessed-inquirer"
is co-mon to all of us, and it cannot be contested that the present
development of science has been due in large part to the objectivity and
imnartiality of scientists, to their willingness to test their hypotheses
and reject then if they cannot be justified by the experimental or other
processes. This famed objectivity of the scientist is a fairly late
(32) Patterson, supra note 6, at pp.134-141.
(33) Id. at p.137.
(34) Patterson, op.cit.supra note 2, at p.6 0.
(35) Ibidem.
(36) See infra text to note 39.
(37) This paragraph is chiefly based on Patterson, supra note 6, at pp.134-
ichievment, as Dr. J.B. Conant has pointed out, (38) and it may be that
the crushing moral and political responsibilities with which modern
scientists have been burdened will ultimately affect their ability
(and willingness) to differentiate between their "factual" observations
and their own preferences, between scientific facts and moral or
political value-judgments. However that may be, the question arises
of the extent to which the legal inquirer, and especially the judge,
can emulate the scientist's imoartiality. In answering this question,
Patterson adopts a wise, middle-of-the-road approach. He rejects the
view that the use of scientific methods will lead to a fully
predetermined application of legal rules and to the negation of individual
responsibility. But he also refuses to accept that all legal evaluations
depend solely on the inquirer's own preferences and that, therefore, all
generalizations about them are mere a posteriori rationalizations. On the
contrary, it is possible for judges to study objectively a situation while
being aare of their owne evaluations of it. This is neither a perfect
situation, nor in all cases a fully consistent one, nor can it be
e:pressed in "objective" quantitative terms. Nonetheless, it does work
in fact, even if within certain limitations. As Patterson states:
The strict ethical standards that surround the judge and
the deep sense of responsibility that judges in our
society feel are the best guarantees of ethical neutralism
in the making of judicial evaluations that we have as yet
found. I believe that judges in their official conduct are
more unbiased than are scientists in their political
pronouncements, but still not as neutral as natural scientists
in their laboratories. (39)
In this as in other respects, Patterson's present approach is consistent
with his earlier position. His treatment of the same topic in his earlier
discussion of the scientific analogy concluded with a quotation from
Eugene Ehrlich: "There is no guaranty of justice save the personality
of the judge."(40)
From the viewpoint of the citizen (and, for present purposes, of
the lawyer who represents him) the prediction theory of the law is
probably the most valid. For the citizen, the legal rule is a given
"fact", which he cannot change and of whose exact content he is highly
uncertain. He is interested in knowing (and his lawyer in advising him)
(38) J.B. Conant, On Understanding Science 22 et seq. (mentor ed.,1951),
cited by Patterson, op.cit.supra note 2, at p.38. And see also, on
the evaluative judgment implicit in the scientist's devotion to
"truth", J. Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science 135 et seq. (Pelican
ed.,1960); J.Bronowski, Science and Human Values 35 et seq. (1956)
(39) Patterson, op.cit.supra note 2, at p.3 7 . For a different approach,
leading nevertheless to comparable conclusions, see J. Stone, "Problems
Confronting Sociological Enquiries Concerning International Law,"
89 Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours 61, 158-75 (1956).
(40) Patterson, supra note 6, at p.136 .
whether his own actual or proposed conduct is or is not in accordance
with this immutable rule. The lawyer's task will then be to find the
law for him, to prophesy as to "what the courts will do in fact." From
this angle, the moral or political "ought" is of relatively minor
significance, important only to the extent that it can predictably
affect the decisions of the courts. The distinction between the legal
"is" and the legal "ought", the law as actually applied or law-in-action,
and the law as supposed to be or law-in-the-books, is of far greater
importance. Seen from this point of view, legal rules present striking
similarities to the laws of the natural sciences. For the citizens,
the law-in-the-books is understood to be law, that is, is felt to be
binding, to the extent that it may be applied in the future. Present
or past practice is an indication of the probability of future
application.(41) Scientific methods or, at least, the basic scientific
approach are of relevance: one is in fact seeking uniformities of
conduct on the basis of which one will deduce that rule A is law-in-
action and rule B only law-in-the-books. The anthropologist's approach
to the legal rules of past or primitive societies- is .essentially the
same: when he finds uniformities of conduct of a certain type, he
concludes that a legal rule did or does regulate the matter.(42)
It has to be admitted, however, that there exists little
inducement for the citizen or his lawyer to enter into such
investigations to any considerablie extent; their inquiry into the facts
usually will remain at the stage of casual observation. Certain useful
insights may thus be gathered but the inquiry seldom reaches levels of
phenomena which are not already fairly obvious. The academic jurist
and-the legal researcher sometimes do approach the law from a comparable
point of view. In most instances, however, they are assisting the
legislator rather than the citizen; their investigation of the law-in-
action is only part of their inquiry. (43)
(41) For a discussion of the function of precedent in this context, see
F. Pollock, "Laws of Nature and Laws of I-an," in Jurisprudence and
Legal Essays 157 (1882, A.L. Goodhart ed., 1961) and "The Science o
Case Law," idem 169, at pp.173 et seq.
(42) This statement, of course, oversimplifies matters. For an analysis
of this aspect of the problem, see E.A. Hoebel, The Law of Primitiv
Man 22-28 (1954)
(43) As far as the academic jurists are concerned, of course, one of the
principal tasks should be (and has been) the construction of theori
An examination of the differences in the points of view of jurists
of different types - advisers, advocates, researchers, academics -
should prove a very rewarding topic of study.
It is the great quality of Professor Patterson's latest book
that, in addition to the systematic overview of the problems of law
in an age of science and to the innumerable ideas and insights on
particular topics that it provides, it also strongly stimulates further
thinking on this all-important topic. It is impossible to tell where
the process of scientific influence on the law will end, or even
uhere it is leading. That it will continue cannot be doubted. The
separation of the two is today still very marked, for most practical
purposes. But the more we become familiar with science and the
scientific approach, the more we shall be prepared to apply-its
methods in law. This does not mean that these methods will be adopted
without any change or adjustment. In an earlier article, Professor
Patterson had already stressed the need for building a law which
would be "scientific in its own terms," which will recognize "the
contingency and limitations of its own decisions" and will be inspired
by a passion for facts and by a faith "in the improvement of results
by using facts." He had concluded: "Law can be scientific if it
have this faith and these works, and if it receive a little charity."(44)
In his Carpentier Lectures, he has now provided a first model for this
quest. And no charity is needed to appreciate his achievement.
(44) Patterson, supra note 6, at 147.
